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Abstract. Tamper-proof devices are pretty powerful. They typically make security appli-
cations simpler (provided that the tamper-proof assumption is not violated). For application
requiring privacy, we observe that some properties may become harder (if possible at all)
to achieve when devices are maliciously used. We take the example of deniability, receipt-
freeness, and anonymity.
We formalize the trusted agent model which assumes tamper-proof hardware in a way
which captures the notion of programmable secure hardware. This model defines a func-
tionality relative to which deniability requires provers to use a tamper proof hardware.
Otherwise, any asymmetric situation in which the malicious verifiers have more powerful
tamper-proof devices than the honest ones makes deniability impossible.
We conclude by observing that the ability to put boundaries in computing devices prevents
from providing full control on how private information spreads: the concept of sealing a
device is in some sense incompatible with some privacy notions.
1 Introduction
Since it is a good idea to ground the security of a system by assuming a powerful adversary, we
should not exclude adversaries which would deliberately cast themselves in a restrictive computa-
tion model, where they have no full control over their memory and computation. Unfortunately,
this is the assumption made by several cryptographic schemes, such as undeniable [5] and ring
signatures [18]. The idea of using tamper-proof devices to realize cryptographic functionalities goes
back (at least) to 1986 [6]. Here, we consider using tamper-proof devices for malicious purposes.
In this paper we show how to make several privacy attacks using trusted tamper-proof devices.
An interactive zero-knowledge (ZK) proof system [8] is a two-party protocol, between a prover
and a verifier, where the prover is able to convince the verifier that a statement holds, without
conveying any information that could not be obtained without interacting with the prover. Clas-
sical ZK proof systems fulfill a privacy property called deniability [16] stating that the verifier
cannot prove knowledge to a third party after interacting with the prover. That is, the verifier
cannot transfer the proof upon completion. The more general concept of non-transferability is
also central in some cryptographic schemes, such as undeniable signatures [5] that use interactive
verification in order to prevent the signature to be authenticated to an unauthorized third party.
A different way to enforce deniability of a signature is to use a group or ring signature [18] between
the signing party and the verifier. In this case, the signer can deny the signature by claiming that
it was computed by the other party.
Tamper-proof devices have been massively used in industrial and commercial applications.
There exists a wide spectrum of tamper-proof devices, ranging in their price and security, from
simple smartcards to the IBM 4758, which has several physical penetration sensors, including
temperature, radiation, pressure, etc. While these devices exist mostly to defend against privacy
attacks, we show that they can also be used to perform them. We do so by introducing the trusted
agent model. Informally speaking, the trusted agent model consists in assuming that it is possible
to acquire a trusted device (agent) that runs honestly a known program in a secure environment
(tamper proof) without any way of running another program. We show that within this model
and an appropriate universal program, it is possible
– to transfer proofs of zero-knowledge protocols after completion (in particular: to transfer the
verification of an undeniable signature);
– to register rogue public keys and prove the ignorance of a secret key (which then can be used
to break anonymity in ring signatures or non-transferability mechanisms);
– to sell ballots in e-voting systems.
In a nutshell, a tamper-proof device implementing a trusted agent can be used to verify a proof.
Afterward, it can testify that the verification protocol was correctly run by some kind of forensic
evidence. Clearly, such a device could be used to kill the undeniable signature paradigm [5]. One
could say that this trivial attack could be defeated by classical non-transferability techniques like
having a PKI for verifiers [3,7,10,11]. However, the cryptographic assumption of this approach
highly depends on the public-key registration process and happens to be insufficient when we can-
not prevent the malicious verifier for holding the tamper-proof device during the key registration
phase, unless the secret key is escrowed. Key escrow however leads us to other privacy concerns.
Related work. The idea of using tamper-proof hardware to transfer proofs of ZK protocols was
first introduced in the context of quantum memory [13,14]. However, as discussed herein, it can
be extended to commercially available hardware in a practical way. Clearly, people are currently
surrounded by devices (aimed at) instantiating trusted agents. People wear smart cards, secure
tokens, their PCs have Trusted Computing Platforms, their media readers have secure hardware to
deal with DRMs, their iPhones have a self-blocking secure hardware, passports have secure RFID
tags, etc. These devices are (at least) trusted by banks, mobile telephone operators, companies
selling access control devices, software companies, media content providers, hardware manufac-
turers, governments, and so on. It is unlikely that none of these organizations would ever try to
take any malicious advantage out from their devices. So, assuming some adversaries would use
tamper-proof devices for attacks is a legitimate assumption.
In general, setup phases in cryptographic protocols is a critical issue. Authors often assume that
participants securely register their public keys in a honest manner, although doing so is not trivial.
Key setup is still a problem for the Universal Composability (UC) framework by Canetti [4]. For
instance, the key registration model for UC framework by Barak, Canetti, Nielsen and Pass [1] is
quite minimal but assumes that the secret key of honest participants is safely stored by the key
registration authority (so that even the participants ignore their keys). In [17], Ristenpart and
Yilek considered several variants of key registration protocols and have shown tricky interference
with the security in several group signature protocols. They noticed that security proofs often
assume that all participants send their secret keys to a trusted authority in a KOSK model (as
for Knowledge Of Secret Key) although some signature schemes could still be secure in a less
demanding key registration process such as producing a self-signed certificate for the public key,
what they call the POP (as for Proof Of Possession). Our results show that POP is either not
enough in the trusted agent model, or compromises some other cryptographic property.
Katz [12] defined the notion of tamper-proof hardware token. These tokens could be used to
achieve commitment, thus any well-formed functionality. Contrarily to these hardware tokens, we
assume that trusted agents are private (namely: their holders do not give them to another user)
and display the initial code (or its digest) so that any other party can trust that it is still running
in a state which is a consequence of having set it up with this code.
In [16], Pass introduced the notion of deniable zero-knowledge which is immune to oﬄine
proof transfer. Plain zero-knowledge in the standard model is essentially deniable. However, zero-
knowledge in the common reference string (CRS) model is not deniable when it really requires
CRS to work [16]. For instance, non-interactive zero-knowledge [2] is clearly not deniable but
can be achieved in the CRS model. Deniable zero-knowledge in the random oracle model can
be achieved [16]. Our trusted agent model is at least as strong as the random oracle model and
shares similar properties: regular zero-knowledge protocols collapse when the malicious verifier
uses trusted agents. It can be restored by having honest verifiers to use trusted agents or an
appropriate key registration model. However, if trusted agents can be placed inside other trusted
agents, then only a registration model with key escrow will restore deniability.
While it is debatable if the trusted agent model is realizable or not, assuming it cannot be used
by adversaries is a much greater error than assuming that it can. For this reason, we believe that
cryptographers should mind the proposed trusted agent model when designing future protocols.
2 The Trusted Agent Model
In a multiparty setting, several participants or functionalities run different algorithms and can
communicate using pairwise communication channels. Channels are assumed to be secure in the
sense that leakage or corruption in transmitted messages can only be made by one of the two
end participants on this channel. We consider a static adversarial model in which participants
are either honest or corrupted. Honest participants run predefined algorithms whereas corrupted
participants may run arbitrary algorithms and talk to an (imaginary) adversary to collude. We
use calligraphic characters (e.g., PV or FTA) to denote participants and functionalities and capital
characters (e.g., V or M) to denote the algorithms they run. By convention we will denote with
a star ∗ the corrupted participants in a static model. Sometimes, a participant P invoking a
functionality O will be referred to P querying an oracle O and we will write PO for this type of
communication. Later, a trusted agent will be defined by a functionality and used as an oracle. At
the beginning, an arbitrary environment E sends input to all participants (including the adversary
and functionalities) and collect the output at the end.
We stress that we do not necessarily assume that malicious participants have the same privileges
as honest participants, which means that they can have access to different sets of functionalities.
For instance, a malicious participant may use a trusted agent as a tool for cheating while we would
not want a honest one to need an extra device.
Recall that an interactive machine is a next-message deterministic function applied to a current
view. The view of the algorithm is a list containing all inputs to the machine (including the
random coins) and all messages which have been received by the machine (with a reference to
the communication channel through which it was delivered so that they can see which ones come
from a trusted agent). The view is time dependent and can always be expanded by adding more
messages.
We denote by P ↔ V two interactive algorithms P and V interacting with each other, following
a given protocol. When there is a single message sent by e.g. P to V , we say that the protocol
is non-interactive and we denote it by P → V . If OP (resp. OV ) is the list of functionalities
that participant PP (resp. PV ) may invoke when running the algorithm P (resp. V ) we denote by
POP ↔ V OV the interaction. More precisely, we denote by POP (rOP )(xP ; rP )↔ V OV (rOV )(xV ; rV )
the experiment of running P with input xP and random coins rP with access to OP initialized with
random coins rOP and interacting with V with input xV and random coins rV with access to OV
initialized with random coins rOV . We denote by ViewV (POP (rOP )(xP ; rP )↔ V OV (rOV )(xV ; rV ))
the final view of V in this experiment, i.e. xV , rV and the list of messages from either P or OV .
The trusted agent model. We assume that it is possible to construct a trusted device (agent) that
runs honestly a known program (a minimal boot loader) in a secure environment (tamper proof).
Moreover we assume that the device’s memory is private, and that the only way to interact with
the device is by using the interface defined by the program. A device is attached to a participant
called its holder. He entirely controls the communication with it. The holder may however show
the display of the device to another participant which would give him some kind of evidence of
the outcome produced by a trusted agent. Below, we model trusted agents.
We consider (probabilistic) interactive Turing machines with four kinds of tapes: the input
tape, the working tape, the output tape, and the random tape. Their state is the state of the
automaton and the content of the working tape. We consider a programming language to specify
the transition function of the Turing machine and its initial state. All trusted agents are modeled
by a functionality FTA. To access to a particular trusted agent, we use a sid value. For each used
sid, FTA stores a tuple in memory of form (sid,P, r, C, state, out), where P identifies the holder of
the trusted agent, r denotes its random tape, C the loaded code to be displayed, state its current
state, and out its output tape. FTA treats the following queries.
Query SEND(sid,m) from participant P: If there is a tuple (sid,P ′, . . .) registered with a par-
ticipant P ′ 6= P, ignore the query. Otherwise:
– If there is a tuple with correct participant, parse it to (sid,P, r, C, state, out) and set in to
the value of m.
– If there is no tuple registered, interpret m as a code C. Extract from it the value state
of its initial state. Then set in and out to the empty string. Pick a string r of polynomial
length at random. Then, store a new tuple (sid,P, r, C, state, out).
Then, define a Turing machine with code C and initial state state, random tape set to r, input
tape set to in, and output tape set to out. Then, reset all head positions and run the machine
until it stops, and at most a polynomial number of steps. Set state to the new state value, set
out to the content of the output tape, and update the stored tuple with the new values of state
and out.
Note that the registered values of (sid,P, r, C) are defined by the first query and never changed.
Query SHOWTO(sid,P ′) from participant P: If there is no tuple of form (sid,P, r, C, state, out)
with the correct (sid,P), ignore. Otherwise, send (C, out) to P ′.
Here, the holder P asks for the creation of a new trusted agent by invoking a fresh instance sid of the
functionality which becomes an agent. The holder is the only participant who can send messages
to the agent. The holder can define to whom to send response messages by the SHOWTO message.
(Incidentally, the holder can ask to see the output message himself.) The response message (as
displayed on the device) consists of the originally loaded code C and the current output out. Since
the channel from FTA to P ′ is secure, P ′ is ensured that some instance of FTA (i.e. some trusted
agent) was run with code C and produced the result out. Showing a trusted agent may provide a
simple way to authenticate some data. By convention, we denote by [C : out] an incoming message
from FTA composed by a code C and a value out. The action of checking [C : out] means that the
receiver checks that it comes form FTA, that C matches the expected code, and that out matches
the expected pattern from the protocol context.
One important property of this functionality is that it is well-formed. We say that a list of
oracles O is well-formed if for any pair (P0,P1) of participants and any algorithm M with access
to O, there exists an algorithm S with access to O such that the two following experiments are
indistinguishable from the environment:
1. P0 runs MO and P1 runs an algorithm doing nothing.
2. P0 runs and algorithm defined by
– for any incoming message m from P 6= P1, P0 sends [P,m] to P1;
– for any incoming message [P,m] from P1, P0 sends m to P;
– upon message [out,m] from P1, the algorithm ends with output out.
The participant P1 runs SO.
Typically, S emulates the algorithm M by treating all messages forwarded by P0 and by using P0
as a router. This means that the output of O is not modified if the algorithm M is run by P0 or
by P1. Informally, being well-formed means that the distribution of roles among the participants
does not affect the behavior of O. An example of a functionality for which this is not the case is a
key registration functionality who registers the name of the sending participant and reports it to
a directory. So, the adversary could check if the key was registered by P0 or by P1 and tell it to
the environment. As for trusted agents, they do check that messages come from the same holder
but his identity has no influence on the result.
Clearly, our model for trusted agent could easily be implemented (assuming that tamper-proof
devices could be manufactured) provided that we could trust the trusted agent manufacturer and
that nobody knows how to counterfeit it. Obviously this is a quite strong assumption but this
would still make sense for applications in which there is a liable entity which must be trusted. For
instance, digital payment could rely on trusted agents issued by a liable bank. Indeed, most of
customers now have credit cards with a tamper-proof embedded chips. Some provide trusted secure
tokens like secureID to display private access code for e-banking. Global (nation-wide) e-governance
could be based on protocols using trusted agents issued under the control of observers appointed
by the congress. They already issue passports, ID documents, or health cards with tamper-proof
RFID chips. In this paper, we demonstrate that such devices can be used for malicious reasons
and not only to protect the user against attacks.
Nested trusted agents. Regular trusted agents run Turing machine which cannot interact with
other functionalities during their computation time. We can consider more general trusted agents
who can use external oracles. Typically, we will consider generalized trusted agents (which we call
nested trusted agents) who can become the holder of another trusted agents. To take an example, a
(human) holder may communicate with a trusted agent “of depth 2” modeled by the functionality
F2TA. The participant may then receive [C : out] messages from F2TA (if the holder asked to) or from
the functionality F1TA of regular trusted agents (upon the request by the nested trusted agent).
Formally, if O is a list of functionalities, we consider the functionality FOTA which looks like FTA
with the difference that the running code C can now send messages to all functionalities in O. Note
that if O = ⊥ this means that no oracle is used and then, FOTA is the regular FTA functionality.
When O designate a trusted agent functionality, we assume that FOTA keeps a record of which
instance sid of FOTA queries which instance sid′ of O so that only the holder device FOTA(sid) can
communicate to a designated trusted agent O(sid′), just like for human holders. Equivalently, we
can say that FOTA works by cloning itself in clones FOTA(sid).
We define F0TA = ⊥ (this is a dummy functionality doing nothing) and FnTA = F
Fn−1
TA
TA iteratively.
We have F1TA = FTA. We further define FNTA = FFNTATA . That is, instances of FNTA can invoke FNTA.
We obtain a hierarchy of functionalities starting with⊥ and FTA and ending with FNTA. To simplify,
we consider FnTA as a restricted usage of FNTA for all n. That is, holders load nested trusted agents
with codes which are clearly made for an agent of a given depth. A participant receiving a message
[C : out] from FNTA can see that it is from a trusted agent of depth bounded by n.
3 Forensic Attacks Based on a Trusted Witness
We recall here the definition of a zero-knowledge argument of knowledge system [8,9]. We adapt
it so that the prover and the verifier can talk to a list of oracles (typically: trusted agents). Quite
importantly, we do not assume that honest and malicious verifiers can use the same oracles.
Definition 1 (Zero-knowledge argument). Let R(x,w) be a predicate relative to a statement
x and a witness w, OP ,OV ,O∗V be three lists of oracles initialized using a list of random coins
rI . An argument of knowledge for R relative to (OP ,OV ) is a pair (POP , V OV ) of ppt interactive
machines POP (x,w; rP ) and V OV (x, z; rV ) such that: x is a common input; P has a secret input
w; V has an auxiliary input z and produces a binary output (accept or reject); and, moreover, the
system fulfills the following properties:
– Completeness: ∀rI , rP , rV , x, w, z R(x,w) =⇒
(
POP (x,w; rP )↔ V OV (x, z; rV ) accepts
)
– Soundness: there exists a ppt algorithm E (called extractor) which is given full black-box
access to the prover such that for any x and z, any ppt algorithm P ∗ with access to OP , if
the probability (over all random coins) that P ∗OP (x; rP ) ↔ V OV (x, z; rV ) makes V accept
is non-negligible, then EP
∗
(x; r) produces w such that R(x,w) with non-negligible probability
(over r).
The argument system is called zero-knowledge (ZK) relative to O∗V (or O∗V -ZK) if for any ppt
algorithm V ∗O
∗
V with access to O∗V there exists a ppt algorithm SO
∗
V (called simulator), which
could be run by the verifier, such that for any x, w, and z such that R(x,w), the experiments
of either computing ViewV (POP (x,w; rP )↔ V ∗O
∗
V (x, z; rV )) or running SO
∗
V (x, z; r) produce two
random (over all random coins) outputs with indistinguishable distributions.
Our definition of zero-knowledge is essentially deniable because the simulator can be run by the
verifier [16]: V ∗ cannot produce some y which could serve to feed a malicious prover P ∗.3
Theorem 2. Let OP ,OV be any oracle lists. We assume OV is well-formed. Let NOV be a
nested trusted agent with OV embedded. Let R be any hard predicate. No argument of knowledge
(POP , V OV ) for R such that V only receives messages from OV or the prover PP is NOV -ZK.
In particular, if O is a trusted agent, no (P, V ) argument for R is O-ZK: if a malicious verifier can
use a trusted agent but the honest verifier does not, the argument system is not deniable.
Our result shows the inadequacy of deniable zero-knowledge as soon as adversaries can use
trusted agents. It does not mean that deniable zero-knowledge is impossible in this model since
honest participants could also use trusted agents to protect against transference attacks.
Trusted Agent Prover Verifier
witness: w common: 1λ, x aux.: z
C←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
b = R(x,w)
x,w←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
output (b, x)
[C:b,x]−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (SHOWTO V ) [C:b,x]−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ check x, b = 1
Fig. 1. UC-realization of the FZK in the FTA-hybrid model.
The table below summarizes feasibility results for ZK arguments depending on oracle accesses.
oracle for P oracle for V oracle for V ∗ feasibility comment
none none none yes
none FnTA FnTA yes
none FnTA Fn+1TA no Th. 2
none FNTA FNTA no Th. 2
FTA any any yes Fig. 1
4 Malicious Use of Tamper-Proof Agents
Shedding light on invisible signatures (invisibility loss). Undeniable signatures were invented by
Chaum and van Antwerpen in [5]. These are defined by two algorithms and a relation R: algorithm
Setup(1λ;Ks) = Kp is making keys and algorithm Sign(m,Ks; r) = s is making signatures. The
relation R(x,w) with witness w = Ks defines valid signatures x = (m, s,Kp). The scheme also
comes with two ZK proof of knowledge protocols
(PConfirm(x,Ks; rP ), VConfirm(x; rV )) and (PDeny(x,Ks; rP ), VDeny(x; rV ))
for the relations R and ¬R, respectively. Besides the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge prop-
erties, the scheme requires signature to be existentially unforgeable and invisible. Several defini-
tions for invisibility exist in the literature. The weakest one requires the existence of a simulator
S(m,Kp; r) = s that makes strings look like signatures, such that no algorithm based on Kp only
can distinguish between Sign and S. This does not prevent from transferability issues. Clearly, a
verifier V ∗ for (Confirm or Deny) equipped with a trusted agent O could transfer a proof univer-
sally to any oﬄine W . Somehow, this malicious verifier would remove the “invisibility shield” on
the signature which would then become visible.
There are some undeniable signature schemes featuring non-transferability properties [15].
They however require verifiers to be given public and privates keys as well.
3 This notion of deniability is sometimes called self-simulatability [1] to avoid confusion with other notions
of deniability which are used in encryption or signature.
Selling votes (receipt-freeness loss). Another application where transferring the protocol to a
trusted agent would be dangerous is for e-voting: clearly, a trusted agent casting a ballot on behalf
of a malicious elector could later testify the ballot content and receipt-freeness would be broken.
E-democracy could collapse due to corruption with the help of trusted agents.
Resurrecting rogue-key attacks on group signatures. Ring signatures were proposed by Rivest,
Shamir and Tauman [18] to allow members of a certain group to sign a message without conveying
any information on who inside the group signed the message. Informally, the ring signature works
as follows. A signer creates a “ring” of members including himself. Each ring member 1 ≤ i ≤ n has
a public ki and secret key si. The public key specifies a trapdoor permutation and the secret key
specifies the trapdoor information needed to compute its inverse. The signing process generates
a ciphertext that could have been generated by anyone knowing at least one secret key. The
verification process only requires the knowledge of the public keys. This way, the signer can hide
in a ring that he created himself. Ring signature can be used e.g. for whistleblowing in order to
protect the signer. Ring signatures can be used as a countermeasure to spamming. The idea is
to have every email sent together with a ring signature of a ring consisting of the sender P and
the receiver V . The reason to have email signed by the sender is to authenticate its origin and
moreover, to make the email somehow binding. The reason to have the receiver in the ring is to
prevent him from exhibiting the signed email to a third party W ∗. In such a case, the email could
have been forged by the receiver V ∗ so the sender can deny it.
If one member, say Victor, of the ring can prove the ignorance of his own secret key, then he
can show that he was not able to sign any message with the ring signature, that is, he denies the
signature. This is the rogue key attack. To defeat this, public keys must be securely registered,
meaning that registrants should prove their knowledge of the secret key to the registration au-
thority. In [17], Ristenpart and Yilek proved that ring signatures could guaranty anonymity for
rings larger than 2 even when the adversary can select the keys under the key registration model
using an simple proof protocol consisting of issuing a self-signed certificate.
To defeat this countermeasure, Victor owning a trusted agent could have his agent to simulate
a key registration process so that only the agent would know the secret key. The attack could be
more vicious here since the agent could still be used to sign messages in a ring. The only difference
is that the agent would keep record of all signed messages and could, upon request, certify that a
message was signed or not. The signature by the trusted agent of the certificate together with its
code is an evidence to anyone trusting the agent.
Finally, we could prove that the only ways to avoid this new attack would be one of the
following: to enforce key escrow by the authority; to make honest participants use trusted agents
to help registering keys.
5 Conclusions
We have defined the Trusted Agent Model. In the past, several cryptographic protocols requiring
trusted agents have been proposed but researchers prefer to develop protocols without them.
However it does not prevent to maliciously use such devices if they exist. We devised scenarii in
which adversaries equipped with such devices could defeat several cryptographic properties, e.g.
invisibility in undeniable signatures, receipt-freeness in e-voting, or anonymity in ring signatures.
Fundamentally, these failures come from the strange nature of deniability in protocols.
Although our attacks are pretty trivial, we think the issue of malicious use of trusted devices
has been overlooked so far. Clearly, these devices could break some protocols. To the authors it
does not seem acceptable on one hand, to accept tamper-proof hardware, and on the other hand,
assume that adversaries cannot use such hardware and its properties to perform attacks.
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